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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Neil Patterson contends the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion
to appoint post-conviction counsel because that decision was not made in accordance with the
applicable legal standards.  In the district court’s own words, it “denied the Petitioner’s request
for the appointment of counsel because this  Court  determined  the  Petitioners  claims  were
without merit.”  (R., p.103 (emphasis added).)  However, the Idaho Supreme Court has made it
eminently clear that “[b]y not specifically addressing the appointment of counsel issue before
dealing with the substantive issues of [the] Petition, the district court abuses its discretion.”
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793 (2004) (emphasis added).
Under the proper standard, post-conviction counsel should have been appointed because
Mr. Patterson asserted the possibility of a valid claim – that trial counsel was ineffective due to
his improperly promising Mr. Patterson would receive a particular sentence in exchange for
pleading guilty.  As a result, this Court should vacate the judgment dismissing Mr. Patterson’s
petition and remand this case for further proceedings after post-conviction counsel is appointed
to represent Mr. Patterson.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the underlying criminal case, Mr. Patterson entered a guilty plea to felony driving
under the influence pursuant to a plea agreement.  (R., pp.4-5.)  In exchange, the State agreed to
dismiss a persistent violator enhancement.  (See R., p.35.)  The district court imposed a unified
term of six years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. State v. Patterson, 2016
Unpublished Opinion No. 657, Docket No. 43899 (Ct. App. 2016) (holding the district court did
2not  abuse  its  discretion  by  imposing  an  excessive  sentence).   The  district  court  ultimately
relinquished jurisdiction. Id.
Mr. Patterson subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged,
inter alia, that his guilty plea had been coerced by defense counsel.  (R., pp.6, 8-9.)  In his
affidavit in support of his petition, he stated that he felt coerced by trial counsel’s statements,
particularly  as  those  statements  related  to  trial  counsel’s  efforts  to  get  the  persistent  violator
enhancement off the table.  (R., pp.8-9.)  In response to the State’s ensuing motion for summary
dismissal, he expounded on that allegation, asserting that trial counsel had promised his sentence
would result in his participation in the CAPP rider program followed by probation after
successful completion of that program, but that he had ultimately been placed in the traditional
rider program before jurisdiction was relinquished.1  (R., p.63.)  He argued this amounted to a
coercive and improper promise of a particular sentence.  (See R.,  p.63.)   Mr.  Patterson  also
moved for the appointment of post-conviction counsel.  (R., pp.21-23.)
The State moved for summary dismissal of the petition, asserting Mr. Patterson had
presented no evidence to support his assertion that defense counsel had coerced his guilty plea.
(R., pp.69-70.)  It also attached a copy of the questionnaire Mr. Patterson had filled out when he
entered his guilty plea, and argued it disproved his claims.2  (R., pp.70, 74-79.)
1 Unlike his initial petition, Mr. Patterson’s response to the State’s motion for summary dismissal
was not notarized.  (See R., p.7; see generally R., pp.61-68.)
2 Although the guilty plea questionnaire was attached to the State’s motion, the district court did
not formally grant the State’s implicit request for the district court to take judicial notice of either
that  document  or  the  other  documents  the  State  attached  to  its  filings.   (See R., pp.44-54; see
generally R.)  To make such documents part of the post-conviction record, the district court must
specify which documents and exhibits of which it is taking judicial notice. See, e.g., I.R.E.
201(c)-(d); Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 835-36 (2010); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,
648 (Ct. App. 1994).  However, it appears the district court implicitly took judicial notice of
those documents, as it referenced the guilty plea questionnaire, for example, in its order
dismissing the petition.  (See, e.g., R., p.99.)  As a result, a motion for this Court to take judicial
3The  district  court  ultimately  granted  the  State’s  motion  and  summarily  dismissed
Mr. Patterson’s petition.  (R., pp.88-104.)  As to the substantive merits of the coercion claim, it
concluded Mr. Patterson had failed to substantiate his claim with the requisite affidavits, records,
or  other  evidence.   (R.,  p.98.)   It  also  concluded  that  claim  was  disproved  by  Mr.  Patterson’s
answers  in  the  guilty  plea  questionnaire,  as  his  recitation  of  the  sentence  recommendation  the
State agreed to make (for ten years, with four years fixed) did not mention a promise for a CAPP
rider, and he had answered “No” to the question about whether anyone had made promises or
was forcing him to plead guilty.  (R., p.99.)  As such, the district court concluded:  “This Court
denied the Petitioner’s request for the appointment of counsel because this Court determined the
Petitioner’s claims were without merit.”  (R., p.103.)
Mr. Patterson filed a notice of appeal timely from the final judgment.  (See R., pp.106,
108-10; Order Granting Motion [to Withdraw Dismissal Order and Reinstate Appeal], dated
May 1, 2017.)
notice of the documents the State attached to its  filings has been filed contemporaneously with
this brief.
4ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Patterson’s motion for
appointment of post-conviction counsel based on its consideration of the substantive merits of
his petition, rather than ruling on the motion for appointment of counsel first, as required by
Idaho Supreme Court precedent.
5ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Patterson’s Motion For Appointment
Of Post-Conviction Counsel Based On Its Consideration Of The Substantive Merits Of His
Petition, Rather Than Ruling On The Motion For Appointment Of Counsel First, As Required
By Idaho Supreme Court Precedent
The  Idaho  Supreme  Court  has  made  it  clear  that,  “[b]y  not  specifically  addressing  the
appointment of counsel issue before dealing with the substantive issues of [the] Petition, the
district court abuses its discretion.” Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793 (2004) (emphasis
added); see also State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (when reviewing for an abuse of
discretion, the appellate court considers:  (1) whether the district court recognized the issue was
one of discretion; (2) whether it acted within the bounds of that discretion and consistent with the
applicable legal standards; and (3) whether it reached its decision in an exercise of reason).  The
reason the district court must address the appointment-of-counsel issue first is because that issue
is assessed under a different, lower standard than the substantive merits of the petition. See, e.g.,
Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 655 (2007).
The standard for determining whether to appoint post-conviction counsel under I.C. § 19-
4904 only requires the petitioner to “allege[] facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim.”3
Charboneau,  140  Idaho at  793.   At  that  point,  the  district  court  should  “give  the  petitioner  an
opportunity with counsel to properly allege the necessary supporting facts.” Id.  Having
provided that opportunity to perfect the possibly-valid claim, the district court will have
sufficient information to properly assess the substantive merits of the petitioner’s claims and
3 A valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel would contend that trial counsel’s
performance was objectively deficient and was prejudicial to the petitioner. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984).
6determine whether (still considering all the inferences in the light most favorable to the
petitioner) he has presented a genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 792-93.
The reason for these different standards, according to the Idaho Supreme Court, is to
address the realities that exist in pro se petitions for post-conviction relief:  “‘petitions and
affidavits filed by a pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete.  Although facts
sufficient  to  state  a  claim may not  be  alleged  because  they  do  not  exist,  they  also  may not  be
alleged because the pro se petitioner simply does not know what are the essential elements of a
claim.’” Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793 (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679 (2001)).
The district court failed to follow the Idaho Supreme Court’s clear instructions in its
consideration of Mr. Patterson’s motion for appointment of post-conviction counsel.  Rather, it
“denied the Petitioner’s request for the appointment of counsel because this Court determined
the  Petitioner’s  claims  were  without  merit.”   (R.,  p.103  (emphasis  added).)   Thus,  by  its  own
words, it began its considerations with the substantive merits of Mr. Patterson’s claims, and after
that, considered whether to grant his motion for appointment of post-conviction counsel in light
of its conclusions on the substantive merits.  That is exactly the opposite of what it was supposed
to do.
As  a  result  of  this  abuse  of  the  district  court’s  discretion,  this  Court  should  vacate  the
judgment summarily dismissing Mr. Patterson’s petition, especially since his filings, considered
under the proper standard, do assert the possibility of a valid claim.  Specifically, he claimed trial
counsel  had  coerced  his  guilty  plea.   (R.,  pp.6,  8-9.)   He  asserted  trial  counsel  did  so  by
promising, as part of his sentence, he would participate in the CAPP rider program, and
ultimately, be placed on probation, but those promises were not fulfilled.  (R., p.63.)
7The United States Supreme Court has recognized that trial counsel may perform
deficiently by promising a particular sentence, and, if allegations that such a promise was made
are true, the petitioner “is entitled to have his sentence vacated.” Machibroda v. United States,
368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962); see, e.g., Wellnitz v. Page, 420 F.2d 935, 936 (10th Cir. 1970)
(succinctly summarizing this rule as:  “if an attorney recklessly promises his client that a specific
sentence will follow upon a guilty plea, . . . the question may arise whether such assurances were
coercive, or whether such representation may be deemed constitutionally ineffective”); cf.
Davidson v. State, 92 Idaho 104, 105-06 (1968) (pointing out that good-faith advice from
counsel about the likely outcome at sentencing, without more, is not sufficient to establish
coercion).  Therefore, Mr. Patterson’s assertion – that trial counsel promised him a particular
sentence – identifies the possibility of a valid claim because, if he could prove that assertion, he
would be entitled to relief.
It is true, as the district court pointed out, that Mr. Patterson did not present evidence in
support of his assertion regarding the details of trial counsel’s promise.  (See R., p.98.)  That is
because his response to the State’s motion for summary dismissal (in which he articulated those
details) was not notarized, nor was it accompanied by affidavits establishing the facts referenced
therein.   (See generally R.)  Still, he did allege facts relevant to his claim, such as, that he felt
coerced by trial counsel’s statements regarding the plea.  (R., pp.8-9.)  The details of trial
counsel’s statements to Mr. Patterson which demonstrate the coerciveness are simply additional
facts to which he could, with the assistance of counsel, properly attest. See Mata v. State, 124
Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993) (also noting that the allegations of the petitioner alone can
establish a genuine issue of material fact).  That is, after all, part of the purpose of appointing
8post-conviction counsel:  to “give the petitioner an opportunity with counsel to properly allege
the necessary supporting facts.” Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793 (emphasis added).
As such, the district court’s reliance on the lack of factual support to justify denying
Mr.  Patterson’s  request  for  counsel  is  improper  and  illustrates  the  flaw  of  using  the  wrong
standard to assess the request for counsel.  While the lack of evidence may show that a claim, on
its substantive merits, fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact, the assertion Mr. Patterson
made still raises the possibility that, with the assistance of post-conviction counsel, the petitioner
could yet provide the appropriate facts to support the claim, and so, he should still be appointed
counsel. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793.  However, the backward way in which the district court
approached this case took away that opportunity to perfect his possibly-valid claims.  As such,
the district court’s decision to deny the motion for appointment of post-conviction counsel is not
consistent  with  the  applicable  legal  standards.   Therefore,  it  is  an  abuse  of  the  district  court’s
discretion.
The district court also based its decision on the substantive merits on the fact that
Mr. Patterson had, on the guilty plea questionnaire, responded in the negative to the question
about whether anyone had made promises about the sentence if he pled guilty.4  (R., p.99.)
However, as the Idaho Supreme Court has indicated, such information (that the defendant was
otherwise  made  aware  of  the  underlying  reality  of  his  situation)  has  no  impact  on  the  analysis
4 The  district  court  also  pointed  to  the  fact  that  Mr.  Patterson’s  recitation  about  the  sentence
recommendation the State agreed to make, which did not mention a promise about the Rider
programs, as disproving his claim.  (R., p.99.)  However, that point is irrelevant not only to the
question of whether counsel should have been appointed, but to the merits of the claim as well.
What the State agreed to recommend has no impact whatsoever on whether or not defense
counsel promised Mr. Patterson that he would ultimately receive a different sentence.  That
would, regardless of the State’s recommendation or the defendant’s understanding thereof, still
be deficient performance by the attorney. See Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 493.
9under the deficiency prong of Strickland. See, e.g., Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 166-67
(2014) (“the district court’s actions in informing Murray of his Estrada rights5 do not affect the
Court’s analysis under the deficiency prong of Strickland.”)  Thus, the fact that the district court
may have, through its questionnaire, discussed this matter with Mr. Patterson does not eliminate
trial counsel’s obligations to properly and effectively advise Mr. Patterson about what accepting
the plea agreement means or whether it is a worthwhile course of action (as opposed to
exercising the right to a trial). See id.  As such, that fact does not mean Mr. Patterson failed to
allege the possibility of a valid claim.
Mr. Patterson recognizes that, in Murray, the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that
the district court’s advice to the petitioner about his rights meant he had not shown prejudice
under the second prong of Strickland. See Murray, 156 Idaho at 167.  However, in reaching that
conclusion, the Murray Court relied on the transcript of the change of plea hearing in that case,
which showed the petitioner was given the opportunity to discuss the issue with trial counsel
after the district court identified it. See id. at 167-68.  Here, though, no such transcript was
proffered to the district court nor is there an indication the district court took judicial notice of a
transcript sua sponte.   (See generally R.)  As such, the post-conviction record in this case does
not indicate any such discussion took place between Mr. Patterson and his attorney, and so, there
is still the possibility that  Mr.  Patterson  could,  with  the  assistance  of  post-conviction  counsel,
make out a valid allegation of prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s deficient performance.6
See Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793 (explaining that, in such cases, the district court should “grant
the petitioner the opportunity with counsel to properly allege the necessary supporting facts”).
5 Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 (2006).
10
On this point, it is important to remember the Idaho Supreme Court’s admonition that a
pro se petition might not include such facts, not because they do not exist, but simply because
the pro se petitioner is unaware that he needs to allege them as part of the claim he is trying to
make. Brown, 135 Idaho at 679.  It is also important to remember the Idaho Supreme Court’s
further  admonition  that  the  potential  results  of  the  appointed  attorney’s  investigation  of  the
possible claim are irrelevant to the determination of whether counsel should be appointed in the
first place. Swader, 143 Idaho at 655 (“The investigation by counsel may not produce sufficient
evidence to survive a motion to dismiss.  But, the decision to appoint counsel and the decision on
the merits of the petition if counsel is appointed are controlled by two different standards.”)
With  both  those  admonitions  in  mind,  Mr.  Patterson’s  claim  does  not  fail  for  the  reasons  the
claim in Murray failed.
Therefore, despite his answers on the questionnaire, Mr. Patterson’s petition still
identifies the possibility of a valid claim, which is all he needs to identify in order to justify
appointment of counsel under I.C. § 19-4904. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793.  As before, the
district court’s rationale is only relevant to the determination of whether the allegations, on their
substantive merits, set forth a genuine issue of material fact.  However, such a determination on
the  merits  cannot,  according  to  the  Idaho  Supreme  Court,  happen  until  after  the  district  court
completes the first step of determining whether counsel needs to be appointed. Id.  As such, the
district court abused its discretion by, directly contrary to the applicable Idaho Supreme Court
precedent, ruling on the merits of Mr. Patterson’s allegations before ruling on his request for
appointment of post-conviction counsel to assist him in developing those allegations.
6 For example, Mr. Patterson might be able to allege that, as part of the alleged effort to coerce
the guilty plea, trial counsel instructed him to answer that particular question as he did, telling
him he had to answer that way if he wanted the judge to accept his plea.
11
CONCLUSION
Mr. Patterson respectfully requests this Court vacate the judgment dismissing his petition
and remand this case for further proceedings after post-conviction counsel is appointed to
represent him.
DATED this 31st day of July, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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